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"And, I mean every word of it: Comments on Francis Dupuis-Déri’s “Global Protesters Versus
Global Elite: Are Direct Action and Deliberative Politics Compatible ?”"AND, I MEAN EVERY WORD OF IT: 
COMMENTS ON FRANCIS DUPUIS-DÉRI’S “GLOBAL
PROTESTERS VERSUS GLOBAL ELITE: ARE DIRECT 
ACTION AND DELIBERATIVE POLITICS COMPATIBLE?”
GENEVIEVE FUJI JOHNSON
SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY
ABSTRACT
Focusing on how recent protests centered on global economic and environmental injus-
tices can contribute to furthering deliberative politics and realizing deliberative demo-
cracy, Francis Dupuis-Déri examines the important and historical tension between force
and persuasion. However, casting protest as legitimate in the framework of deliberative
politics and as serving deliberative democracy obscures its own value in endeavors to
achieve social, economic, and environmental justice. Being sympathetic to Dupuis-Déri’s
work, I wish to make several, interrelated conceptual and practical clarifications in order
to bring back to the fore the fundamental importance of protest, in terms of contribu-
tions not to deliberative politics and deliberative democracy but to public discourse. 
RÉSUMÉ
À partir d’une analyse de la manière dont les actions directes s’opposent aux injustices
économiques et environnementales et peuvent contribuer à faire avancer et à réaliser la
politique délibérative, Francis Dupuis-Déri examine la tension historique et importante
entre la force brute et le pouvoir de persuasion. Cependant, le fait de chercher à légitimer
la protestation dans le cadre de la politique délibérative et comme un moyen pour les fins
d’une démocratie délibérative obscurcit la valeur propre des protestations pour réaliser la
justice sociale, économique et environnementale. Étant sympathique aux travaux de Du-
puis-Déri, je tiens à faire plusieurs clarifications conceptuelles et pratiques en vue de ra-
mener  à  l'avant-scène  l'importance  fondamentale  des  protestations,  en  terme  de
contributions non pas à la démocratie délibérative, mais au discours public.
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2“Polemarchus said, ‘Socrates, I guess you two are hurrying to get away to town.’ 
‘That’s not a bad guess,’ I said.
‘Well,’ he said, ‘do you see how many of us there are?’
‘Of course.’
‘Well, then,’ he said, ‘either prove stronger than these men or stay here.’
‘Isn’t there still one other possibility …,’ I said, ‘our persuading you that you
must let us go?’
‘Could you really persuade us,’ he said, ‘if we don’t listen?’
‘There’s no way,’ said Glaucon.
‘Well, then, think it over, bearing in mind we won’t listen.’” 
Plato, Republic, trans. Bloom, 327c
“You keep on saying ‘Go slow!’
‘Go slow!’
But that’s just the trouble
‘do it slow’
Desegregation
‘do it slow’
Mass participation
‘do it slow’
Reunification
‘do it slow’
Do things gradually
‘do it slow’
But bring more tragedy
‘do it slow’
Why don’t you see it
Why don’t you feel it
I don’t know
I don’t know
You don’t have to live next to me
Just give me my equality
Everybody knows about Mississippi”
  Nina Simone, “Mississippi Goddam,” (1964)1
These two passages—one from a text composed more than 2,500 years ago by
one of the West’s best known philosophers, the second from one of the most fa-
mous songs of the Civil Rights era written by an icon of American music—may
appear incongruous at first glance.But, they share profoundly important themes
not immediately obvious. In particular, they share themes of the powerful “not
listening” to the powerless, and of those with power oppressing those without in
terms of their fundamental interests. In this context, they both subtly invoke the
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2importance of direct, confrontational action over more deliberated means of per-
suasion when seeking substantive social and political change.They are both sub-
versive pleas for direct action over persuasion in quests for justice.
As the character of Socrates describes at the outset of Plato’s Republic, he and
Glaucon were essentially forced to accompany the group of men to Polemarchus’
home where the rest of this famous dialogue is said to have transpired. In this
opening scene, we get a sense of an important tension that runs throughout the
ensuing discussion of justice—a tension between physical force and reasoned
persuasion. One might think that Socrates represents reason and Polemarchus
(then Thrasymachus, then others) represent force.But, the tension plays out and
is resolved in ways that can be quite surprising to contemporary readers who
believe ardently in the justificatory potential of speech and reason. It’s impor-
tant to remember that justice in Plato’s “ideal constitution,” the kallipolis, is
achieved only through exercising force upon both those who presently rule (and
don’t listen) and upon prospective rulers (i.e., the lovers of reason and wisdom).
Ultimately, Socrates represents force. Force presents itself as a necessary pre-
cursor to justice and, in particular, a just polis. In Nina Simone’s “Mississippi
Goddam,” we get a deeper and more urgent sense of this tension. “Why don’t
you see it? Why don’t you feel it?” she demands with reference to the unspeak-
able injustice of the murder of four children in Alabama and of an activist in
Mississippi. More broadly, she makes these demands with reference to the
racism entrenched in the culture, society, politics, and institutions of the Amer-
ican South.As became clear, force (expressed in both non-violent boycotts, sit-
ins, and other acts of civil disobedience as well as in violent race riots) was
necessary—often tragically necessary—to bring about social and constitutional
changes in the US toward ending race-based discrimination, oppression, and in-
justice. Suggested by both the works of Simone and Plato, the politically pow-
erful—those with power to make publicly binding policies and laws—are often
deaf and blind to profound injustice. Persuasion is ineffective where they don’t
listen, and tragedy can ensue where we move too slowly toward justice.As we’ve
seen over the course of history, direct action has its own rightful and important
place in the struggles toward justice, legitimacy, and empowerment for all.
Francis Dupuis-Déri (2007) examines this tension between force and persua-
sion in his writing on the relationship between protest action and deliberative
democracy. He focuses on recent protests centering on global economic and en-
vironmental injustices and on how these protests can contribute to furthering
deliberative politics and realizing deliberative democracy. Dupuis-Déri’s most
basic argument is that protest and direct action are legitimate on the terms of
deliberative democracy and may make deliberation “freer, more equal, and just.”
What I find most interesting in his work is his presumably inadvertent revealing
of the profound limitations of the ideal of deliberative democracy. I say “pre-
sumably inadvertent” because Dupuis-Déri does not develop what could be a
very rich argument for the value of protest not in the service of deliberative
democracy but toward much richer ends of justice. It’s as though he sees the
limitations but nonetheless wants to uphold deliberative democracy as an ideal
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2for political life. He thus seeks to rescue this ideal from political and practical
irrelevance by recourse to asserting the value of protest and direct action in its
terms. He claims that protest and direct action can provide for the resuscitation
of this ideal. As it stands, his argument that protest can make contributions to
achieving deliberative democracy unduly elevates the value of the latter and ob-
scures that of the former. Casting protest as legitimate in the framework of de-
liberative politics and as serving deliberative democracy obscures its own value
in endeavors to achieve social, economic, and environmental justice. I am sym-
pathetic to Dupuis-Déri’s work but wish to make several, interrelated conceptual
and practical clarifications in order to bring back to the fore the fundamental
importance of protest.
1
The first clarification relates to the nature of protest and deliberation. It’s im-
portant to be clear that neither is an end in itself. Both are means to much richer
ends. This essential characteristic is more obvious in protest than deliberation.
In part, this is because what we know of protest is based on what we have ob-
served over history. Protests have often been violently crushed. Protesters have
often been willing to be jailed, beaten, and killed not for the protest per se (ob-
viously) but for the critically important ends of social and environmental justice.
Deliberative democracy, on the other hand, is largely an academic creation (see,
for example, Chambers 1996, Cohen 1993, 1997a, and 1997b, Gutmann and
Thompsom 1996, Habermas 1995, and Rawls 1992)—a creation that has been
over-theorized. Innumerable political theorists (myself included) have exten-
sively debated the conceptual and normative minutia of the deliberative ideal
(see Bohman and Rehg 1997, Freeman 2000, Gutmann and Thompsom 2000,
and Macedo 1999).To be sure, the ideal embodies compelling principles, derived
from contemporary liberalism, that are related to the fundamental moral equal-
ity of persons. Moreover, it exemplifies the moral and political imperative that
publicly binding policies be based on public reason—reason that is generally
acceptable to all members of the public.These features, however compelling, do
not  constitute  what  is  ultimately  sought  through  deliberative  politics  and
processes. Deliberative democracy refers to a decision-making ideal to govern
the development of binding laws and policies for the collective existence of
morally equal and free individuals.Deliberative politics refers to an idealized set
of procedures and orientations to enable a specific kind of engagement of indi-
viduals seeking to develop laws and policies that are publicly justifiable. Like
protest, both are means toward even richer goals, which include an end to racism,
sexism, and homophobism, an equitable distribution of resources across society
and societies, healthy and sustainable natural environments, and richer cultural,
literary, and artistic collective tapestries. 
Related is the second clarification that I wish to make.Although they may share
common goals, deliberative politics and protest action are fundamentally dif-
ferent strategies. Epistemologically, deliberative democracy is deduced from
primary principles of liberalism including equality, freedom, and public reason,
whereas our understanding of protest is induced from historical social phenom-
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2ena directed at fighting intolerable systemic and overt inequality, exclusion, ex-
ploitation, and oppression.Deliberation is based on the presuppositions that pub-
licly shared reasons are sufficient to cause change and that deliberators are both
willing and able to articulate good reasons and, in turn, willing and able to un-
derstand, listen, and respond to them. Deliberation is also based on the presup-
position of reciprocity. It is based on an assumption that procedures and
orientations will facilitate fair and inclusive dialogical exchanges toward the
reasoned agreement—or, better, consensus—of deliberators, thus providing jus-
tification for publicly binding laws.Protest is based on the recognition that good
reasons are insufficient to cause change because those with the political power
to make social, institutional, and environmental change are not willing to listen
to and act on them. Moreover, protest is based on the recognition that, in the
context of wide inequalities in political power, there is and can be no reciproc-
ity. Protest assumes the obstinacy of the powerful in upholding their privilege.
It assumes protracted disagreement between the powerful and powerless. Prac-
tically, the objectives of both protest and deliberation differ as well.Deliberation
requires achieving inclusive and informed dialogical exchanges governed by
equality and fairness. It requires deliberators to attain a high level of rationality
that is directed toward consensus. Protesters seek to assert excluded perspec-
tives, voices, and interests in the face of power. Protesters seek collective soli-
darity to, agonistically, make themselves heard by the politically powerful and
to force change in times of urgency.
Protest rightfully picks up where deliberation leaves off. Persuasion of the kind
envisioned by deliberative democrats is possible only where those they are try-
ing to persuade are willing to listen to reason. Deliberative politics and democ-
racy are achievable only where there is reciprocal reason-exchanging and a
shared willingness to listen to and be moved the better reason.They are achiev-
able only where those with political power listen to those over whom they exert
their power. It is contingent on those who are in positions of power within pol-
icy implementation and formulation processes to incorporate into their decisions
the outputs of deliberative democratic processes.Historically, those in positions
of power generally don’t listen where their power is at stake, where their inter-
ests may not be served. This is a reality that we see even in contemporary exer-
cises that (ostensibly) attempt to realize principles of deliberative democracy in
areas of public policy (see Johnson 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2011). From vastly
different historical and cultural perspectives, both Plato and Simone speak to
this reality of political power. In their own ways, they recognize the limitations
of persuasion and issue calls for political action that is more forceful. Implicit
in these calls is the recognition of the distinct value of confrontation in further-
ing the ends of justice.
The third clarification has to do with the critical importance of the motivation of
the politically powerful to make social, political, economic, and environmental
change through deliberative democratic means.As Dupuis-Déri writes, “the de-
liberative process often falls short” of its ideal (170).The passivity that Dupuis-
Déri implies in his language that processes of deliberative democracy “fall short”
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2misplaces the problem.The consequence is to obscure problems that are not pri-
marily with the processes but with actors engaging in and upholding these
processes. More troubling is that the language suggests that these processes can
be ameliorated without having to assess and address the motivations and actions
of those involved in these processes and, especially, those who maintain ulti-
mate decision-making power. Dupuis-Déri’s main argument is that protest may
help to “improve the quality of deliberation and to move from an elitist deliber-
ative regime toward a more participatory regime” (174). He argues that protest
and direct action may improve deliberation in terms of 1) agenda setting, 2) en-
larging participation, 3) enlarging representation, 4) disseminating information,
5) stimulating imagination, 6) pushing for action, and 7) re-opening deliberations
(179-181). He is able to make this argument only by bracketing the role of pow-
erful actors who host deliberative democratic exercises and who control the in-
terpretation of deliberative outputs and their articulation in policy decisions. If
we shift perspective toward powerful actors, who function in both broader con-
texts of structural social, economic, and political inequalities and specific pol-
icy contexts that are inherently unequal, we can see that deliberative democratic
processes do not fall short but rather are made to fall short. In the several cases
that I have studied, ostensibly deliberative democratic procedures and forums
come close to meeting the requirements of the ideal, but powerful actors thwart
the outputs of these procedures at the policy development and implementation
stages. Dupuis-Déri, while offering an insightful account of protest, does not
provide a compelling account of how it can further deliberative politics in these
contexts—in these contexts where policy makers are not motivated to enlarge
their agenda, include more people and perspectives, disseminate information,
and push for action against their interests.
My fourth, related clarification centers on the contribution of protest—since
clearly protest does make and has made important contributions.But, to what ex-
actly? Dupuis-Déri provides scant evidence for what he purports are contribu-
tions of protest to deliberative politics and democracy. He does, however, show
how protest contributes to public discourse, which is much broader than delib-
erative politics and deliberative democratic procedures. Protest contributes to
public discourse, that is, the broad themes and specific issues discussed in tra-
ditional, popular, and alternative media, discussed in public forums by pundits,
academics, and other “opinion leaders,” but also by everyday people in more
private exchanges around the water cooler or at the dinner table. Public dis-
course is distinct from procedures and orientations of deliberative democracy
either in their manifestations in stakeholder/elite negotiations or in citizen as-
semblies. Both kinds of collective decision-making forums can be based on prin-
ciples  of  deliberative  democracy,  which  we’ve  seen  in  a  diversity  of
contemporary policy areas. Both could contribute to a flourishing deliberative
democracy, which, I should state the obvious, we haven’t seen and likely will not
ever see because of the obstinacy of the politically powerful where their inter-
ests could be compromised. The contributions of protest to these deliberative
forums and to deliberative democracy are profoundly limited by the willingness
of powerful actors to listen and to act on what they have heard.
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Dupuis-Déri’s argument gets much more traction if posed in terms of contribu-
tions not to deliberative politics and deliberative democracy but to public dis-
course. Indeed, as we can see in the “Occupy” movement that is taking place
across North America, protest is contributing directly to public discourse in the
ways identified by Dupuis-Déri. Many of us have something to say about this
movement, which began as an appeal in an alternative magazine to “occupy Wall
Street” (Culture Jammers 2011). We can, from varying perspectives, connect
concerns expressed by “occupiers” to our individual and collective concerns.
These protests are putting onto the agenda for public discourse a broad set of is-
sues related to the debt crisis, vast income discrepancies, gross taxation in-
equalities, and widespread environmental degradation. We have seen growing
participation (in numbers of participants, cities, states, and provinces) and rep-
resentation (of different sectors) in the movement. We can also see the dissem-
inating information via traditional and new forms of media. This movement is
also spurring many people’s imagination to conceive of and develop alternative
forms of collective existence. But the impact of this movement on actual deci-
sions is far from clear.This movement isn’t likely to improve deliberation in the
formulation and implementation of policy concerning adequate social programs,
a fair system of taxation, or sufficient environmental protection. The impact of
this movement remains contingent on the willingness of those with decision-
making power in these processes to listen to those claiming to speak for the
“99%” and respond to what they’ve heard. In this example, we see the contri-
butions but also the limitations of protest. Protest makes direct contributions to
public discourse but makes limited to deliberative politics, procedures, and out-
puts. The value of protest lies in mobilizing members of the demos to a level of
political significance at which they are able force change toward the broader
ends of justice. The value of protest is not in service to deliberative democracy
but in service to broader ends—especially where these ends are stymied by those
who do not see or listen.
Protest is a very valuable form of political activity. It signifies expressed differ-
ences in perspectives between citizens and government, and it signifies courage
on the part of citizens to stand up and voice opinions against governments that
are often willing to use overwhelmingly violent force to suppress them. This
civic courage is a necessary component of a healthy democracy or republic.Im-
portantly, protest, if forceful enough and if politically significant enough, can
contribute to bringing about positive change as we’ve seen over history where
the powerful are otherwise disinclined to listen. Protest has made, and does
make, valuable contributions to the ends of justice, legitimacy, and empower-
ment. Protest and deliberative democracy are both means to these ends. Protest
has a distinct value that should be kept separate from that of deliberative democ-
racy. My overarching concern is that Dupuis-Déri’s line of argument results in
the subsuming of what should be held as the distinct value of protest into the
laudable but largely unattainable goals of deliberative democracy.The rich ends
of protest and deliberative democracy are shared.But, in the context of profound
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2structural inequalities and a lack of willingness by elites to see, listen, and to be
persuaded, the specific objectives of protest and direct action should stand dis-
tinct. Plato and Simone were alive to this reality. So should we be.
NOTES
1 In a 1964 recording of Simone in concert, she begins this song with “And, I mean every
word of it.”  Toward the end of the song, she adds: “I betch ya thought I was kiddin’.”  These
two comments, along with the show tune characteristics of the song, give rise to a profoundly
ironic feel.  This irony, in turn, lends itself to the subversive nature of her performance and
recording.  This performance is itself an act of defiance, an act of protest, and an act of di-
rect action, invoking the importance of defiance, protest, and direct action."
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